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ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the hypothesis that the most important
and, often, controversial and divisive cases—so called “big” cases—
are disproportionately decided at the end of June. We define a “big
case” in one of four ways: front-page coverage in the New York
Times; front-page and other coverage in four national newspapers
(the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and
Chicago Tribune); the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in a case;
and the number of subsequent citations by the Supreme Court to its
decision in a case. We find a statistically significant association
between each measure of a big case and end-of-term decisions even
after controlling for the month of oral argument (cases argued later in
the term are more likely to be decided near the end of the term) and
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case attributes (e.g., dissents and concurrences) that increase the time
it takes to decide a case. We also speculate on why big cases cluster at
the end of the term. One possibility is legacy and reputational
concerns: when writing what they think will be a major decision, the
Justices and their law clerks take more time polishing until the last
minute with the hope of promoting their reputations. Another is that
the end-of-term clustering of the most important cases may tend to
diffuse media coverage of and other commentary regarding any
particular case, and thus spare the Justices unwanted criticism just
before they leave Washington for their summer recess.
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INTRODUCTION
High court judges manipulate the timing of their decisions. In
Brazil, for example, judges have been known to delay hearing the
case or announcing or publishing the decision until there is a more
1
favorable political climate (or court). Strategic timing of judicial

1. See, e.g., Diego Werneck Arguelhes & Ivar A. Hartmann, Timing Control Without
Docket Control: How Individual Justices Shape the Brazilian Supreme Court’s Agenda (May
28, 2014) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Studies on
Constitutional Courts, FGV Direito Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Werneck and Hartmann describe a procedure in which an individual Justice can
request to “take a look” at a case (pedido de vista). Id. at *5. According to the data Werneck
and Hartmann collected, use of the pedido de vista procedure has delayed decisions “for years,
even decades.” Id. at *4.
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decisions also seems to occur in the U.S. state courts. In contrast, the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, once they accept a case for
3
4
review, rarely if ever delay decision in this way. The Court usually
5
issues its decision within three months of oral argument; only the
very rare case bounces around the chambers for more than six
months, and almost every decision is issued in the same term in which
6
the case is argued.
Still, commentators have long speculated that the most important
and, often, controversial and divisive cases—the “big” or
“blockbuster” cases (we’ll use “big cases” for brevity)—are issued in
June (the last month before the Court’s summer recess) and mostly in
7
8
the last week or two of June —the so-called “end-of-term crunch.”

2. An example is the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which delayed an opinion in
connection with the 2006 nomination of Associate Justice Peter Zarella for chief justice:
Upon the announcement of Chief Justice Sullivan’s impending retirement, Governor
M. Jodi Rell nominated Associate Justice Peter Zarella to be elevated to chief justice.
However, unbeknownst to the governor and just before her announcement, the chief
justice had already begun to play politics with the Zarella nomination. In early March
2006, the chief justice had ordered the reporter of judicial decisions to delay the
printing of a controversial decision regarding freedom of information and the judicial
branch. Thus, in his attempt to aid and elevate his friend Justice Zarella, Chief Justice
Sullivan obstructed the course of the nomination process by depriving the
Connecticut General Assembly’s Judiciary Committee of knowledge of Justice
Zarella’s concurrence in the opinion.
J. Michael Green, Constitutional Crisis Averted in Connecticut, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 114, 114–15
(2008) (citations omitted).
3. There are many examples, though there is little systematic evidence, that the Justices
use their discretionary power over which cases they will hear to set their plenary agenda to
avoid certain issues. See, e.g., DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1980).
4. The Court can avoid reaching a decision on the merits even after it has agreed to
decide the case, for example, by finding that the Court lacks jurisdiction (if there’s no
jurisdiction, the case is nonjusticiable), though it usually explains its decision. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 578 (1992); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974).
5. Our sample includes 7219 cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms. We exclude
all reargued cases and those argued or decided in special sessions (usually in July, August, or
September), as well as Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952), which was continued twice. This
eliminates 181 cases. The mean time from oral argument to decision in the 7219 sample is 83.6
days (the median is 75), with a standard deviation of 46.2.
6. This holds for 99 percent of the cases. Only reargued cases are held over. Of the 7400
cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms, 171 were reargued but only 34 in the same
term.
7. The Supreme Court’s term begins on the first Monday in October. The Court begins its
summer recess in June or early July. Of the 67 terms in our dataset (1946–2012), only 12 ended
in July (OT 1995 was the last to do so).
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This shouldn’t be surprising. More than 30 percent of the decisions in
a term are issued in June (see Figure 1) and more than half of the
June decisions come in the last week (see Figure 2). But the claim
about big cases is stronger: namely, that they are disproportionately
decided at the end of June. Imagine the Court decides 100 cases in a
term and of these 15 are decided in the last week of June. Suppose
further that the Court decides 20 big cases in the term and 10 of them
in that last week. Then big cases make up a disproportionate share of
cases decided in the last week of June—67 percent (10/15) compared
to 12 percent in the earlier parts of the term (10/85).
Figure 1. Orally Argued Cases by Month of Decision, 1946–2012
Terms

Note: Excludes all reargued cases and those argued or decided in
special sessions (usually July, August, or September). See supra note 5.

8. Richard L. Hasen, What’s Taking the Supreme Court So Long?, DAILY BEAST (June
21, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/21/what-s-taking-the-supreme-court-solong.html.
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Figure 2. Cases Decided in the Last Four Weeks of the Term, 1946–
2012 Terms

Note: Our sample consists of 2210 cases decided in June and 115 in July.
Cases decided in July are included in the “Last Week” category.

This Article investigates the phenomenon just described. We
begin in Part I by identifying four approaches to determining a “big
case”: front-page coverage in the New York Times; front-page and
other coverage in four national newspapers (the New York Times,
Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune); the
number of amicus curiae briefs filed in a case; and the number of
subsequent citations by the Supreme Court to its decision in a case.
Also in Part I we ask whether a disproportionate number of big cases
fall at the end of the term. The answer is yes: We find a statistically
significant association between each measure of a big case and endof-term decisions.
Part II of this Article considers three hypotheses for why big
cases cluster in the last week of the term:
1. Suppose a case argued close to the end of the term is
more likely to be decided near the end of the term than a case
argued early in the term (what we call the “compression
effect”). If big cases were disproportionately argued later in
the term, this would make an end-of-term decision more
likely.
2. Big cases have attributes such as more dissents and
concurrences that tend to increase the time it takes the Court
to decide a case, and thereby increase the probability that a
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case will be decided near the end of the term (holding
constant the month of oral argument, as hypothesis 1
suggests).
3. The Court follows, or acts as if it follows, a policy of
issuing the big decisions at the end of the term quite apart
from the month of oral argument or the presence of attributes
that increase the time it takes to decide a case.
Our test of hypothesis 1, the “compression effect,” uncovered no
significant relation between big cases and the date of oral argument.
Part II.A analyzes hypothesis 2 by estimating two sets of regressions:
one aimed at understanding the factors that predict the length of time
from oral argument to decision and the other aimed at understanding
the factors that predict whether a case is big or not. From that
analysis we learn that big cases possess many of the same attributes
that lengthen decision time. For example, they are often more
controversial and divisive than the average case and therefore require
9
more time to decide. Cases that take more time to decide will tend to
cluster at the end of the term.
Part II.B considers whether the Court is more likely to decide big
cases at the end of the term even after we hold constant variables
such as the month of oral argument (critical to the compression
effect), the term of the decision, and work-related and other
attributes that lengthen the time it takes to decide a case. The
regression analysis shows that there is still a significant “pure” or
“net” big-case effect separate from the compression effect, the term
of the Court, and work-related and other attributes. In other words,
we are left with the finding that the Court does, in fact, save the best
for last—or at least acts as if it does.
We conclude with some speculation, based on reputational,
public-relations, and social concerns, about why the Justices appear to
follow a policy of issuing a disproportionate number of big-case
decisions late in the term.
I. SOME PRELIMINARIES
Without concrete measures of what is a “big case,” we can’t
systematically test claims about the Court issuing its important
decisions at the end of the term. We explain the measures we use and

9. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, Hasen reaches a similar conclusion. Id.
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then show that there is an association between big cases (regardless of
the measure we use) and end-of-term decisions.
A. Defining a Big Case
Although it’s widely believed that decisions in the big cases are
disproportionately issued at the term’s end, to our knowledge no one
has subjected the proposition to empirical testing. This may be
because of the difficulty in defining a big case other than by “I know
it when I see it.” We take a more systematic approach by using four
measures of whether a case is “big”:
(1) New York Times: whether the Times carried a frontpage story about the case on the day after the Court decided
10
it. About 14 percent (1016 cases) of the 7219 cases in our
database received front-page coverage.
(2) Case Salience Index: whether the Times, Washington
Post, Los Angeles Times, or Chicago Tribune carried a story
about the case. A case that received front-page coverage is
scored as a 2; if it received coverage elsewhere in the paper, 1.
The index ranges from 0 to 8 (8 being coverage on the first
11
page of all four papers).
(3) Total Amicus Briefs: total number of amicus curiae
briefs filed in the case. At least one amicus brief was filed in
62 percent of the cases in our sample (4460 out of 7219 cases);
a single amicus brief in 17 percent (1245 cases); two to five
amicus briefs in 28 percent (2053 cases); and more than five in
16 percent (1162 cases). One hundred forty-three amicus
briefs were filed in one case, but that’s rare; in fewer than 2
percent of the cases were 20 or more briefs filed (131 cases).
(4) Citations: number of Supreme Court citations between
12
1946 and 2001 to cases in our dataset. Obviously the older
the case, the greater the number of citations it is capable of

10. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72
(2000).
11. The Case Salience Index was invented by Todd A. Collins and Christopher A. Cooper,
Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure, 65
POL. RES. Q. 396 (2012). We thank the authors for their data, which span the 1953–2004 terms.
12. The dataset, available at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/judicial.htm, was developed and used
by James H. Fowler and Sangick Jeon in The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC.
NETWORKS 16 (2008).
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receiving. Because we’re comparing the number of citations
to cases decided at the end of June with the number decided
earlier in the term, the fact that older cases tend to have more
citations shouldn’t bias our results too much. (Cases decided
early in the term are, at most, only nine months older than
those decided in June.) Still, when we use citations as a proxy
for big cases we include dummy variables for each term in
order to hold constant the effect of the age of a case on
citations.
Table 1. Summary Information on the Four Measures of Big Cases
Measure

Coding

(1) New York
Times

1 (on front page);
0 (not on front page)
0 (no coverage in any of four
newspapers) to 8 (front-page
coverage in all of four
newspapers)
Number of briefs

(2) Case
Salience Index
(CSI)
(3) Total
Amicus Briefs
(4) Citations

14

No. of Cases
(Terms
Covered)
7219
(1946-2012)
5896
(1953-2004)

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Range

0.141
(0.348)
2.761
(2.160)

0-1

7219
(1946-2012)
6304
(1946-2001)

3.033
(6.162)
11.467
(16.064)

0-143

0-8

Number of Supreme Court
0-266
citations to Supreme Court
cases
Note: The N of 6304 in row 4 (Citations) is the number of cases that cite the cases in our dataset.

15

Political scientists often use the first two measures —as we have
16
17
in our work —but there are two difficulties. The first is that
newspaper coverage (particularly front-page coverage, which is the
New York Times measure and part of the Case Salience Index) of a
Supreme Court decision is negatively affected by competition from
other events that occur at the same time, including another Supreme
Court decision (or decisions) issued the same day. As a result even a
big case may sometimes not receive much or even any newspaper
coverage. The second difficulty is that newspaper coverage, being
13. A simple regression of the number of citations to each case on the logarithm of the
term yields a regression coefficient of -0.475 and a t-value of 17.8.
14. For cases included in and excluded from our sample, see supra note 5.
15. The Case Salience Index is more recent, see supra note 11, but the concept underlying it
is similar to that of the New York Times measure.
16. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013).
17. Epstein & Segal, supra note 10.
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motivated by journalistic concerns, may bear little relation to the
legal importance of a case. For example, in 2009, Melendez-Diaz v.
18
Massachusetts appeared on the front page of the Times, but Ashcroft
19
v. Iqbal did not. Melendez-Diaz is an important case. It held that
reports by crime labs are inadmissible unless the analyst who
20
prepared the report testifies at the defendant’s trial —a ruling that
21
upset ninety years of practice in most states. Although less
interesting to the average newspaper reader, Iqbal is the more
important case because along with the Court’s earlier decision in Bell
22
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly it made it easier for federal district courts
to dismiss cases before pretrial discovery. To date courts have cited
Iqbal in nearly 69,000 decisions, compared to only 2160 decisions that
23
have cited Melendez-Diaz. Yet this deficiency in the two criteria that
rely on newspaper coverage need not undermine our analysis; if the
Justices delay decisions in order to blunt criticism they should be
more apt to do so in cases, like Melendez-Diaz, that are likely to
generate substantial media attention.
Our third measure, Total Amicus Briefs, stands for the
importance of the case to persons who either consider it very
interesting or significant or are most likely to be affected by the
Court’s decision. Unlike our other criteria, amicus briefs are not only
an indicator of the importance of a case but also a factor that may
increase the time between oral argument and decision and so cause a
case to be decided later in the term independently of the importance
24
of the case. Although the Justices probably read few of the amicus

18. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
19. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
20. Or, if the analyst is unavailable, the defense must have had a “prior opportunity for
cross-examination.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309.
21. See id. at 349 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
23. Figures are from Shepard’s, accessed through LEXIS Advance on September 22, 2013.
24. See Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on
Amicus Curiae in the 2012-13 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), available at http://www.arnold
porter.com/resources/documents/NLJ_The%20Supreme%20Court’s%20Reliance%20on%20A
micus%20Curiae%20in%20the%202012-13%20Term_Franze%20and%20Anderson.pdf. They
ask why the Court hasn’t “discouraged amicus filings” if “more briefs equal more work.” Id. at
*1. The answer, they propose, is that the Justices “find the briefs useful.” Id. This conclusion
may be self-serving (the authors are lawyers at Arnold & Porter, which represents amici in the
Supreme Court), but scholarly studies confirm it. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., FRIENDS OF THE
SUPREME COURT (2008); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). In addition to providing
empirical evidence of the influence of amicus briefs, Kearney and Merrill note that “the most
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briefs filed, their law clerks at least skim them in order to “separate
25
the wheat from the chaff” for their bosses. The fact that most
Justices cite to amicus briefs in a third or more of their opinions
suggests that someone is reading them (though probably only a law
clerk—yet law clerks write most judicial opinions, in the Supreme
Court as in most other American courts). And the more there are, the
26
more there is to read, although this doesn’t mean that more is read.
Conceivably if more amicus briefs are filed in cases decided late in the
term, this could be a sign that these were big cases or could just mean
that cases in which a large number of briefs are filed take more time
to decide.
The fourth measure of case importance that we use is citations in
Supreme Court opinions to earlier Supreme Court decisions.
Citations are a widely used measure of importance and influence and
have the virtue of relying on the Court to tell us ex post what it
27
considers to have been an important or unimportant decision. Of
course it’s always possible that the Justices who believed a case to be
28
big at the time they decided it turned out to be mistaken.
As Table 2 shows, the four measures are positively and
significantly correlated. The strongest correlation is between the two
media measures, since the New York Times is a factor in both.
Overall, the correlations are modest. This justifies our approach of
using several measures of a big case rather than just one.

common reaction among lawyers and judges [toward amicus briefs] is moderately supportive.
Amicus briefs, it is said, can provide valuable assistance to the Court in its deliberations.”
Kearney & Merrill, supra, at 745. This view, they point out, is not universally shared. Id. at 745–
46. One of us (Posner) has written, “The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies
of the litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants’ briefs, in effect merely
extending the length of the litigant’s brief.” Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125
F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
25. See Franze & Anderson, supra note 24, at *1. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 102–03 (2008)).
26. See, e.g., id.; Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years,
89 JUDICATURE 127, 132 (2005).
27. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251–52 (1976); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig &
Michael Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271–72 (1998); see also James H. Fowler, Timothy R. Johnson, James F.
Spriggs II, Sangick Jeon & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the
Legal Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325–26 (2007).
28. Also bear in mind, as noted earlier, that the number of citations is biased downward
because the data cover all citations in the 1946 to 2001 period. Thus, the closer the decision date
of a case to 2001, the fewer the number of years to accumulate citations.
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficients for the Four Measures of Whether a
Case Is Big
CSI

Amicus Briefs

Citations

New York Times
0.62**
0.23**
0.28**
CSI
0.26**
0.30**
Amicus Briefs
0.10**
Notes:
(1) Correlations of Citations with the other measures of big cases are partial correlations that
hold constant the term of the decision to take account of the negative relationship between
citations and term.
(2) **Significant at .01 level.

B. A First Look at Whether Big Cases Cluster at the End of the Term
As Figure 3 shows, all four measures of a big case support the
existence of an end-of-term cluster effect. Overall, 24.2 percent of all
cases decided in the last week of June make the front page of the New
York Times compared to only 15.3 percent for cases decided earlier in
June and to 11.3 percent for cases decided in all other months
combined. The CSI averages 3.6 for cases decided in the last week in
June, 2.8 for earlier in June, and 2.6 for the other months. The
average number of amicus curiae briefs per case is 5.2 for cases
decided in the last week of June, 3.1 for cases decided earlier in June,
and 2.5 for cases decided in other months. The number of citations
averages 16.3 per case for cases decided in the last week of June, 11.1
for cases decided in other weeks in June, and 10.4 for cases decided in
other months. These differences between the last week and earlier in
the term are statistically significant for all four measures.
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Figure 3. Big Cases as the Term Progresses, Month-by-Month (with the
Last Week of June Separated Out)

Notes:
(1) Month is the month the case was decided. We include the small number of cases
decided in July (115) in the last week of the term in June.
(2) p ≤ .01 for all month comparisons (and the first three weeks of June) with the last
week of June.
(3) We exclude 18 cases decided in October; 171 reargued cases; 9 cases argued or
decided in special sessions (usually over the summer); and one case that was continued
twice. See supra note 5.

II. EVALUATION OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES
Figure 3 provides evidence that the Court does stack a
disproportionate number of decisions in big cases in the last week of
the term. We explore three explanatory hypotheses. Hypothesis 1, the
compression effect, is that because the Court almost always decides
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29

cases in the same term they were argued, the later the date of oral
argument the more likely the case will be decided near the end of the
term. So if more big than small cases happen to be argued late in the
term, they would be expected to be decided later. The data, however,
does not support this hypothesis. We find no significant relation
30
between any of our four measures and the date of oral argument.
A. Work-Time Factors and End-of-Term Clustering
Hypothesis 2 states that big cases possess attributes that lengthen
the time to decision. They may be more contentious, more divisive,
and therefore generate a higher fraction of dissenting and concurring
opinions, and are very unlikely to be decided in short per curiam
opinions. The more opinions in a case, the longer the case should take
to decide. Justices writing separately—that is, dissenting or
concurring—may not begin to write until the majority opinion is
circulated, or if they do begin earlier, they will often have to revise
when they see that opinion. The Justice assigned the majority opinion
may feel that he has to revise it in light of the separate opinions, and
his revisions may engender a new round of revisions by the authors of
those other opinions. It wouldn’t be at all surprising, therefore, that
multi-opinion decisions would cluster at the end of the term—not
because they are big but because they have attributes that elongate
the work time required for completion and issuance. We use
regression analysis to explore this hypothesis.
1. Regression Models. To test the effect of work-time factors on
end-of-term clustering, we estimate the following two regression
models from data on orally argued cases in the 1946 to 2012 terms.
(1)
(2)

Days-to-Decide = f(Month, Work-Related Attributes, Other
Case Attributes, Term) + u
Big Case = g(Case Attributes, Term) + w

29. This holds for about 99 percent of the cases argued in the 1946–2012 terms. See supra
note 6.
30. We estimated regressions in which the dependent variable is one of the four big
measures and the independent variable is the difference in days between the end-of-term date
and the oral-argument date (the smaller the difference, the closer oral argument is to the end of
the term). In three regressions (New York Times, Citations, and Amicus), the coefficient on the
independent variable is insignificant. In one (the CSI) it is significant but indicates that the
earlier (not later) the case is argued, the greater the value of the CSI.

PEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1004

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/6/2015 3:19 PM

[Vol. 64:991

In equation (1), the dependent variable Days-to-Decide is the
difference in number of days from the date of oral argument to the
date of decision. The independent variables are as follows; u denotes
the residual.
a. Seven dummy variables (denoted by Month) for the month of
oral argument (starting in October and ending in April where
31
May/June is the omitted variable ). These variables test the
compression effect. We expect the coefficients on the monthly
dummies to be positive (since May and June have the shortest time
between argument and decision), declining the closer the month is to
the end of the term.
b. Work-Related Variables, such as the number of opinions in a
case, are expected to affect the time to decision. The variables we use
are the fraction of dissents (Dissent) and concurrences (Concur); the
number of issues (Issues) in the case (79 percent of our sample
involve one issue, 17 percent involve two issues, and only 4 percent
involve three or more issues); the number of Justices (Justices) voting
(9 Justices vote in 78 percent of the cases, 8 in 18 percent, and
between 5 and 7 in fewer than 5 percent); and a Per Curiam variable
(about 7 percent of our sample are per curiam decisions), which is
likely to reduce the time to decision because cases decided per curiam
tend to be less contentious, and more often unanimous, than cases
32
decided in a signed opinion. Thus we expect positive coefficients on
all the work-related variables but a negative coefficient on the Per
Curiam variable.
c. Other Attributes include characteristics of cases that may
lengthen decision time, but we lack a strong conviction that they do.
Consider the number of amicus briefs (the Amicus variable). One
could argue that the greater the number, the more time the Justices
and their clerks will spend reading them and therefore the more time
it will take to decide the case. But one could equally argue that
amicus briefs may supply information or arguments that reduce the
amount of research and analysis that law clerks need to do. We also
include in Other Attributes dummy variables for whether the decision
holds a statute unconstitutional (Unconstitutional) or formally alters,

31. We combine May and June into a “single” month because only 79 (about 1 percent) of
the cases in our sample are argued during these two months.
32. In our dataset, the Court decided 59.2 percent of the per curiam decisions by a
unanimous vote compared with 36 percent of the cases resulting in a signed opinion. The
difference is statistically significant.
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by overruling or limiting, a precedent (Precedent Alteration). Other
Attributes also include Civil Liberties and Economic Activity dummy
variables (where the omitted variable is all other issues) to account
for the possibility that these areas may present more (or less) difficult
34
questions and take more (or less) time to decide.
All these variables may indicate a more complex case, implying
positive coefficients in equation (1).
d. Last we include dummy variables for each term (Term). This
allows us to hold constant term-specific effects that may elude the
other variables in the regression.
In equation (2) the dependent variable is a dummy variable of
one of three measures of a big case: New York Times, CSI, and
Citations. We do not estimate equation (2) for the number of amicus
briefs because they are filed before the case is decided and so can’t be
influenced by the outcome variables in equation (2).
A key feature of equation (2) is that it contains many of the same
independent variables as are in (1) because many of the work-related
and other attributes tested in equation (1) are also proxies for the
more important and divisive cases, which are the cases likely to
receive media coverage and many citations. Equation (2) also
includes the Civil Liberties and Economic Activity variables in order
to test whether newspapers are more likely to cover civil liberties
than other areas of law, and a dummy variable for the ideological
direction of the decision (the Conservative variable, 0 for a liberal and
1 for a conservative decision). Liberal newspapers may find a liberal
decision more newsworthy, or at least more pleasing to their readers,
than a conservative one; a further reason may be to avoid calling
35
attention to conservative decisions.
Table 3 defines and presents summary statistics of the variables
used in the regression analysis, and Table 4 presents the regression

33. Unconstitutional and Precedent account for 6.6 percent and 1.9 percent of the cases
respectively.
34. Civil Liberties accounts for 51.5 percent of all cases, Economic Activity (including labor
and tax cases) for 29.5 percent, and all other issues (which include judicial power, federalism,
interstate relations, and a few other small categories) for about 19 percent.
35. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S.
Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35 (2010), show that the political slant of newspapers
depends on the views of their readers. An extension of this argument is that newspapers are
more likely to cover Supreme Court decisions that conform to their readers’ ideological
preferences. Another possibility, however, is that liberal and conservative papers cover the
same cases but slant coverage to conform to their readers’ preferences.
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results. (To simplify the table we omit the individual regression
36
coefficients for the monthly and term dummy variables. )
Table 3. Variable Definitions in Analysis of Important Cases
Variable

Definition

No.
Observations
(Terms)

Mean
(Std.
Deviation)

Range

83.57
(46.20)
0.14
(0.35)
2.76
(2.16)
11.47
(16.06)

0-269

Dependent Variables
Time To Decide

Number of days from oral
argument to decision date

NYT

1=front-page coverage in New
York Times & 0=otherwise

CSI

Index of coverage in four major
newspapers

7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
5896
(1953-2004)

Cites

Number of citations in Supreme
Court cases

6304
(1946-2001)

Dummy variables for month of
oral argument

7219
(1946-2012)

--

0-1

Dissent

Fraction of Justices dissenting
Fraction of Justices concurring

Per Curiam

1=per curiam decision &
0=otherwise

Two Issues

Dummy variable=1 if 2 issues &
0=otherwise

Three Issues

Dummy variable=1 if 3 or more
issues & 0=otherwise

Nine Justice Vote

Dummy variable=1 if 9 Justices
vote & 0=otherwise

0.19
(0.17)
0.09
(0.14)
0.07
(0.26)
0.17
(0.38)
0.04
(0.19)
0.78
(0.42)

0-0.44

Concur

7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)

3.03
(6.16)
0.51
(0.50)

0-143

7219
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)
7218
(1946-2012)
7143
(1946-2012)
7219
(1946-2012)

0.29
(0.46)
0.07
(0.25)
0.02
(0.14)
0.49
(0.50)
--

0-1

0-1
0-8
0-266

Independent Variables
Month

Work-Related

0-0.89
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

Other Attributes
Total Amicus

Number of amicus briefs filed

Civil Liberties

1=civil liberties & 0=otherwise

Economic Activity

1=economic activity &
0=otherwise

Unconstitutional

1= unconstitutional &
0=otherwise

Precedent
Alteration

1=formal alteration of precedent
& 0=otherwise

Ideology

1=conservative decision and
0=liberal decision

Term Dummies

Dummy variables for each term

36. The full regressions are available from the authors.

0-1

0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
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Table 4. Regression Analysis of Number of Days Between Oral
Argument and Decision and of Big-Case Measures (t-ratios in
parentheses)
Independent Variables

Month
Work-Related
Dissent
Concur
Per Curiam
Two Issues
Three or More Issues
Nine Justice Vote
Other Attributes
Total Amicus
Civil Liberties
Economic Activity
Unconstitutional
Precedent Alteration
Ideology
Term Dummies
Constant
No. Observations
2
R
Terms

No. of Days
(4.1)
Yes**

Dependent Variables
New York
CSI Index
Times
(4.3)
(4.2)
-

Cites
(4.4)
-

76.49**
(28.87)
67.17**
(18.40)
-18.57**
(8.89)
0.91
(0.78)
6.90**
(3.04)
-6.74**
(5.58)

0.19**
(9.87)
0.17**
(8.00)
-0.06**
(3.34)
0.02*
(2.14)
0.07**
(5.27)
-

1.81**
(11.98)
1.60**
(8.06)
-0.55**
(6.41)
0.05
(0.82)
0.37**
(2.75)
-

6.90**
(6.34)
16.27**
(9.53)
-8.33**
(15.09)
0.95*
(2.01)
3.91**
(3.54)
-

0.65**
(5.13)
3.45**
(2.99)
-0.75
(0.63)
6.07**
(3.16)
6.09*
(1.97)
-

0.01**
(10.93)
0.10**
(8.85)
0.01
(0.49)
0.05**
(5.69)
0.08**
(4.60)
-0.03**
(4.39)
Yes**
-

0.15**
(10.53)
1.03**
(15.44)
0.16*
(2.42)
0.75**
(7.61)
0.47*
(2.56)
-0.17**
(3.37)
Yes**
-3.80**
(4.75)
5851
0.28
1953-2004

0.24**
(3.99)
3.88**
(8.93)
-2.84**
(6.73)
6.33**
(6.12)
17.86**
(5.18)
-0.98**
(2.84)
Yes**
-3.80**
(4.75)
6241
0.27
1946-2001

Yes**
28.67**
(5.66)
7219
0.39
1946-2012

7143
0.22
1946-2012

Notes:
(1) Regression 4.1 predicts the difference in number of days from the date of oral argument to the date of decision;
Regressions 4.2-4.4 predict whether a case is big or not, using three different big-case measures.
(2) We estimate robust standard errors in all regressions. Significant levels are indicated by * significant at .05 level
and ** significant at .01 level.
(3) Equation (4.2) is a logit regression, and the coefficients are the marginal effects of each variable at the mean values
of the other variables.
(4) Equation (4.1) includes 7 monthly dummy variables, October–April. The omitted monthly dummy covers oral
arguments in May and June.
(5) All regressions include individual term dummy variables.
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2. Results. As expected, the individual dummy month variables
in 4.1 are positive and statistically significant (compared to cases
argued in May and June, the omitted variable), and indicate that
cases argued later in the term take significantly less time to decide.
Starting with November, the values of the monthly dummy variable
are smaller the later the month of oral argument (although the
difference between November and December is not statistically
significant). The one exception is for cases argued in October; the
regression coefficient is significantly smaller than for cases argued in
November, December, or January. On average it takes 55 days to
decide cases argued in April, 94 days for cases argued in January, and
101 days for cases argued in November (holding constant at their
mean values the other variables in the regression). In short, we find a
significant compression effect.
Most of the work-related variables are significant and in the
predicted direction. For example, one dissent increases decision time
by 8.5 days (76.49 times 1/9), one concurrence by 7.5 days (67.17 times
1/9), and a per curiam opinion decreases decision time by almost 18.6
days (holding constant the values of the other independent variables).
Two exceptions are worth mentioning. We find no significant
difference in decision time between a case with one and two issues
but a significant increase of 6.9 days for cases with three or more
issues (fewer than 5 percent of the decisions in our sample resolve
three or more issues, and about 91 percent of those decide no more
than four issues). The other exception is that cases in which 9 Justices
participate take 6.7 fewer days to decide than cases with fewer than 9
Justices. This is puzzling because one would think that with more
Justices voting, more time would be devoted to consultation and
coordination among the Justices. A possible explanation for the
anomaly is that the author of the assigned majority opinion (assigned
in the hope that he can get 5 votes) has to work harder for 5 votes if
there are 8 than if there are 9 Justices, and he can afford therefore to
lose 4. With 8 Justices (which account for about 80 percent of the
cases with fewer than 9 Justices), he can afford to lose only 3, so there
37
may be more negotiating, increasing the time to decision.

37. The difficulty with this explanation is that we also find that it takes more rather than
less time to decide a case with 7 justices than a case with 8 Justices (only 304 cases have 7
compared to 1279 with 8 Justices). If the critical factor is whether there is an even or odd
number of Justices, we should have observed that cases with 7 Justices took less time to decide
than ones with 8 Justices.
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Among the non-work-related variables we find that the number
of amicus briefs, civil liberties cases, cases that find a statute
unconstitutional, and cases that formally alter a precedent are
associated with significant increases in decision time. This suggests
that these variables signify more complex and important cases that
lengthen decision time independent of the work-related variables that
are included in the regression. The regression results indicate that 10
amicus briefs increase decision time by about 6.5 days compared to a
case with zero amicus briefs, civil liberties cases add about 3.5 days to
decision time, and holding a statute unconstitutional or formally
altering a precedent increases decision time by 6.1 days.
Here are some examples of the interplay among the variables in
regression 4.1. Suppose a single-issue civil liberties case is argued in
February, the decision is 5–4 with 2 concurrences, 9 Justices vote, and
10 amicus briefs are filed (holding constant the other variables at
their mean values). Equation (4.1) predicts that the case will take
nearly 4 months (116 days) to decide compared to 2 months (61 days)
for a case argued in the same month and decided with a unanimous
signed opinion, no concurring opinions, and no amicus briefs. At the
other extreme, it takes only 15 days to decide a civil liberties case
argued in April that results in a per curiam decision without a single
dissent or concurrence and with no amicus briefs.
Now consider the two media measures of a big case (regressions
38
4.2 and 4.3). The results support the hypothesis that coverage is
positively and significantly related to the variables that proxy for the
39
more important and controversial decisions. For example, regression
4.2 predicts that a highly important and controversial civil liberties
case with 4 dissents, 2 concurrences, and 10 amicus briefs has a 0.55
probability of coverage on the front page of the New York Times
compared to a 0.05 probability for a unanimous civil liberties case
with no amicus briefs. And if a civil liberties case with the same
characteristics also holds a law unconstitutional or formally alters an
established precedent, the probability of coverage is 0.69 if
unconstitutional and 0.74 if a precedent is altered.

38. Regression 4.2 is a logit regression because the dependent variable is a dummy
variable, which takes the value 1 if the decision receives front-page coverage in the New York
Times and 0 otherwise.
39. We exclude from the big-case regressions the month dummy variables and number of
Justices voting because they should have no bearing on the importance or divisiveness of a case.
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At the other extreme, there is only a 0.02 probability of frontpage coverage of a per curiam decision with no dissents,
concurrences, or amicus briefs. Similarly, the CSI in civil liberties
cases is 4.6 for 5–4 decisions with 2 concurrences and 10 amicus briefs,
but only 1.5 for a per curiam decision with no dissents, concurrences,
or amicus briefs.
Regressions 4.2 and 4.3 show that conservative decisions are less
likely to receive media coverage. The coefficients on the Ideology
variable imply that the probability of front-page coverage in the New
York Times for a conservative decision is 0.03 lower (or about 20
percent lower than the mean coverage value of 0.14) and 0.17 lower in
the CSI (or about 6 percent lower than its 2.76 mean).
Our third big-case measure is the number of times a case is cited
by the Supreme Court (regression 4.4). We expect and find that the
number is positively and significantly related to variables that indicate
the importance of a case. Less obviously, case citations in later cases
are positively and significantly related to the divisiveness of a decision
(not just its importance), as indicated by the regression coefficients on
the fraction of dissents and concurrences. A possible explanation
(which also explains the positive coefficients on the number-of-issues
variables) is that a case with dissents and concurrences, because it
thus has a greater number of opinions, provides more opportunities
for subsequent citations. We also find that civil liberties cases
generate significantly more citations (about 4 more) and economic
cases significantly fewer (about 3 less) than cases in the omitted
category, which account for about 19 percent of our sample and
consist almost entirely of judicial power and federalism cases. And
finally a possible explanation for why a liberal decision (the Ideology
variable) is cited more often (almost 1 more citation per case) is that
our sample contains slightly more liberal than conservative decisions
40
(51 versus 49 percent).
B. So Why Do Big Cases Cluster at the End of the Term?
The regressions in Table 4 confirm our second hypothesis: big
cases have attributes that tend to increase the time taken to decide a

40. The later the date of a Supreme Court decision, the fewer the number of subsequent
terms in which the case can garner citations. We adjust for this by including term dummy
variables. As expected, the term dummy variables tend to become smaller the closer the
decision is to the 2001 term, although many of the differences from year to year are not
significant.
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case, and so increase the probability that the case will be decided near
the end of the term. But the regressions do not eliminate the third
hypothesis: that the Justices act as if they postpone decision in a
disproportionate number of big cases to the end of the term.
We test this hypothesis by estimating what we call “gross” and
“net” (or “pure”) big-case effects. The gross effect estimates the
increase in the probability that the Court decides a big case in the last
week or last two weeks of the term controlling for the month of oral
41
argument and the term of the case; the net effect estimates this
increase but also controls for attributes of the case that lengthen (or
decrease, in the case of a per curiam decision) the time from oral
argument to decision.
1. Gross and Net (or Pure) Big-Case Effects. We estimate gross
and net big-case effects for each of our four measures of big cases by
means of the following equations.
Gross Big-Case Effect
(3)
End of Term = f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies) + u
Net or Pure Big-Case Effect
(4a) End of Term = f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies,
Work-Related Attributes) + v
(4b) End of Term =f(Big Case, Month & Term Dummies,
Work-Related Attributes, Other
Attributes) + w

End of Term is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Court issues its
decision in the last week or last two weeks of the term and 0
otherwise; Big Case is one of our four measures of a big case; Month
& Term Dummies are dummy variables for the month of oral
argument and the term of the court; Work-Related Attributes are the
variables in Table 3 that directly affect the time the Court needs in
order to decide a case; and Other Attributes include variables that are
not clearly related to work time (like a civil liberties case) but still

41. The compression effect has two features: cases argued near the end of term take less
time to decide because the Justices face the end-of-term constraint and are more likely to be
decided in the last week or two of the term even though they take less time to decide. It still
follows, however, that holding constant the month of oral argument, a case that takes more time
to decide is more likely to be decided at the end of the term.
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affect time to decision (see regression 4.1 in Table 4). We estimate
two net big-case equations: 4a includes attributes that directly
influence work time while 4b adds other attributes, such as a civil
liberties dummy variable, that influence time to decision but are not
clearly work-related attributes. From a statistical standpoint, we
should find a smaller net big-case effect in 4b than 4a because the
other attributes in 4b are positively correlated with our big-case
measures and so should weaken the impact of a big case on the
likelihood of a late decision.
Table 5 presents the regression results. To simplify, we present
the regression coefficients (column 3) for only the four big-case
43
measures and not the other independent variables. To understand
the organization of Table 5, consider the three New York Times
regressions. Regression 5.1 indicates that big cases have a higher
probability (0.103) of being decided in the last week holding constant
the month and term of the decision. When we add the work-related
attributes in 5.2, the Times coefficient falls to 0.042, and when we also
add the other attributes in 5.3 the coefficient falls farther, to 0.036. All
three regression coefficients are highly significant and, as predicted,
the gross big-case effect (5.1) is significantly greater than the two net
effects (5.2 and 5.2). We also find that the difference between the two
net-effect coefficients is not significant, so that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the increase in the probability of a last-week decision
is the same for the two net big-case regressions. Although the
regression coefficients of 0.103, 0.042, and 0.036 may appear small,
they are large relative to the mean probability (0.160) of a last-week
decision: the gross big-case effect adds 63 percent (0.103/0.160) and
the two net effects between 23 and 26 percent (.036/.160 and
.042/.160) to the mean probability. The final three columns of the
table show the predicted probabilities of a last-week decision for
cases argued in November, February, and April to highlight the
interaction between big cases and month of oral argument. For
example, the first row of regression 5.1 shows that the probability of a

42. We do not include the Amicus Briefs variable in equation (4b) or the regressions in
Table 5 when we use the New York Times, CSI, or Cites as the big-case measure because we
would then have two big-case measures (not one) in the regression for estimating the effects of a
big case on the probability of an end-of-term decision. Moreover, since the Amicus measure is
positively correlated with the other three big-case measures (see Table 2), we would weaken the
effect of the other measures on the probability of a last-week decision by including the amicus
measure.
43. The complete regressions are available from the authors.
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last-week decision for New York Times big cases is .082 for November
arguments, 0.354 for February, and .0670 for April. These
probabilities are significantly lower for other cases (0.027 for
November arguments, 0.145 for February, and 0.387 for April).
Table 5. Logit Analysis of the Probability of Decision in the Last Week
of the Term and Different Measures of Big Cases
Equation Number &
Measure of a Big
Case

(1)

Attributes
Added to
Regression

Regression
Coefficient
(t-ratio)

Probability Case Decided Last Week of
Term
Value of Big
Month of Oral Argument
Measure
Nov.
Feb.
April
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(2)

(3)

(5.1)

New York
Times

No

(5.2)

New York
Times

Work-Related
Attributes

(5.3)

New York
Times

All Attributes

.103**
(12.33)
.042**
(6.28)
.036**
(5.34)

1
0
1
0
1
0

0.082
0.027
0.033
0.018
0.030
0.018

0.354
0.145
0.200
0.115
0.183
0.113

0.670
0.387
0.570
0.408
0.551
0.412

(5.4)

CSI Index

No

(5.5)

CSI Index

Work-Related
Attributes

(5.6)

CSI Index

All Attributes

.024**
(14.34)
.011**
(8.31)
.010**
(7.38)

8
0
8
0
8

0.110
0.013
0.041
0.011
0.037

0.458
0.084
0.256
0.078
0.232

0.759
0.254
0.649
0.313
0.630

0

0.011

0.079

0.327

(5.7)

Amicus
Briefs

No

(5.8)

Amicus
Briefs

Work-Related
Attributes

(5.9)

Amicus
Briefs

All Attributes

.008**
(11.29)
.004**
(7.78)
.004**
(7.65)

8
0
8
0
8

0.050
0.025
0.027
0.017
0.026

0.239
0.132
0.167
0.111
0.162

0.534
0.357
0.499
0.383
0.500

0

0.017

0.108

0.385

(5.10)

Cites

No

(5.11)

Cites

Work-Related
Attributes

(5.12)

Cites

All Attributes

.003**
(11.06)
.001**
(6.80)
.001**
(5.66)

15
0
15
0
25
0

0.036
0.024
0.023
0.017
0.022
0.018

0.282
0.126
0.137
0.108
0.133
0.109

0.457
0.353
0.453
0.387
0.452
0.394

Notes:
(1) The regression coefficients in column (3) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables. All
regressions use robust standard errors. Significant levels are denoted by * at .05 level and ** at .01 level.
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations. The CSI
regressions cover the 1953 to 2004 terms and 5896 observations, and the Cites regressions cover the 1946 to 2001 terms
and 6304 observations.
(3) The dependent variable in all logit regressions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Court issued its decision in the
last week of the term and 0 otherwise. All regressions include month and term dummy variables. Regressions 5.2, 5.5,
5.8, and 5.11 also include the work-attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two Issues,
Three or More Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 5.3, 5.6, 5.9, and 5.12 include both the work- and other-attribute
variables (the Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration variables).
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2. Results. There is a significant increase in the probability of a
last-week decision for the four big-case measures in every regression
(column (3)). As expected, the gross big-case effect is always
significantly greater than the two net effects; it varies from about
twice (the amicus measure) to three times (the citations measure) the
net measures. We find no significant difference between the two net
big-case effects (one in the regression that includes work-related but
not other attributes and the other in the regression that includes both
types of variables).
We showed in Table 4 that the compression effect results in cases
argued later in the term taking less time on average to decide than
cases argued early in the term (for example, 55 days for cases argued
in April, 94 days for cases argued in January, and 101 days for cases
argued in November). Notwithstanding the decline in decision time, it
still turns out that the later in the term a case is argued, the likelier it
is to be decided the last week, as seen in columns (5) through (7) for
all big-case measures. The likelihood that a case will be decided the
last week of June is always significantly greater if it is argued in April
44
than in February, or in February than in November. And the impact
of the month variable is large. For example, regression 5.1 estimates
that the probability of a last-week decision is 0.67 for a case covered
on the front page of the New York Times and argued in April but 0.39
if the case does not receive front-page coverage (column (7)). These
probabilities decline sharply the earlier the month of oral argument
(0.35 and 0.15 for a February case and 0.08 and 0.03 for a November
case). We find comparably large differences and sharp declines across
months in the two net New York Times big-case regressions (5.2 and
5.3) and, more generally, in all big-case measures.
In the net big-case regressions, the coefficient in column (3)
estimates the increase in the probability that a big case will be
decided in the last week of the term holding constant the other
variables at their mean values. Suppose the case attributes in the
regression take different values than their means. For example,
assume a 5–4 decision with 2 concurrences, 9 Justices voting, and 2
issues decided. Using the New York Times big measure and
regression 5.2 (the net big-case regression that includes work-related
attributes), the probability of a last-week decision for a big case
argued in April is 0.91 compared to 0.85 for other cases, 0.66 versus
44. More generally, this is true as we move from an earlier to later month, although the
differences are not always statistically significant.
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0.51 if the case is argued in February, and 0.22 versus 0.12 if it is
45
argued in November. At the other extreme, consider a unanimous
per curiam decision with 9 Justices voting on a single issue. Although
a New York Times big case still makes a last-week decision more
likely, the probabilities are small—0.17 versus 0.09 for a case argued
in April, 0.04 versus 0.02 for one argued in February, and 0.005 versus
0.003 for a case argued in November; and the differences for each
month are not significant.
Though not shown in Table 5, the Dissent, Concur, and Civil
Liberties variables have significant positive effects, and the Per
Curiam a significant negative effect (in all but the Citations
regression), on the probability that a case will be decided in the last
week. Cases having three or more issues are significantly more likely
to be decided in the last week in the New York Times and Amicus
regressions but not in the other two big-case measures. The number
of Justices voting and the Unconstitutional and Economic Activity
variables are insignificant in all regressions. Precedent Alteration is
significant in the CSI Index and Amicus regressions but not in the
Times and Citations regressions. The monthly dummy variables are
individually significant in all but a few of the regressions, and the
term dummy variables are always jointly significant.
3. Additional Empirical Analysis.
a. The Last Two Weeks of the Term. In Table 6 (which follows
the same format as Table 5 but presents results only for the New York
46
Times and Amicus big-case measures ), we substitute the last two
weeks of the term for the last week because the last week may be too
stringent a test of the hypothesis that big cases disproportionately
cluster near the end of the term.
Overall, 23.8 percent of the cases in our database are decided in
the last two weeks compared to 16 percent in the last week. But this
may not signify that a big case is more likely to be decided in the last
two weeks than in the last week. Suppose that a total of twenty and
thirty cases are decided in the last week and the last two weeks,
45. Note that the probability differences between a big case and non-big case are
statistically significant for each of the three months.
46. The results for the other two big-case measures are similar to those in Table 5—that is,
the regression coefficients on the big-cases measures are always positive and significant, the
gross coefficient is always greater than the two net coefficients, and the differences between the
two net coefficients are never significant.
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respectively, and that the corresponding numbers of big cases are ten
and fifteen. The probability of a big decision is therefore 0.50 for both
the last week and the last two. The New York Times measure of a big
case (equations 6.1–6.3) indicates that the increase in the probability
of a big case being decided in the last two weeks is 0.154 based on the
gross effect and 0.068 based on the net effect. These probabilities are
significantly greater than the corresponding increase in probabilities
(0.103 and 0.039) in Table 5. We find a similar result for the Amicus
big-case measure: 0.011 and 0.007 in Table 6 are significantly greater
than the corresponding increases of 0.008 and 0.004 in Table 5.
Table 6. Regression Analysis of the Probability of the Court Issuing Its
Decision in the Last Two Weeks of the Term
Equation Number
& Big Measure

Attributes
Added to
Regression

Regression
Coefficient
(t-ratio)

(1)

(2)
No

(3)
.154**
(13.19)

1
0

0.104
0.034

0.494
0.230

0.831
0.601

Work-Related
Attributes

.072**
(6.83)

1
0

0.045
0.024

0.333
0.203

0.797
0.666

All Attributes

.064**
(5.96)

1
0

0.043
0.024

0.317
0.203

0.788
0.671

.011**
(10.58)
.007**
(7.62)
.007**
(7.56)

8
0
8
0
8

0.062
0.034
0.035
0.022
0.035

0.346
0.217
0.277
0.189
0.274

0.723
0.577
0.748
0.644
0.750

0

0.022

0.187

0.646

(6.1)

(6.2)

(6.3)

New
York
Times
New
York
Times
New
York
Times

(6.4)

Amicus
Briefs

No

(6.5)

Amicus
Briefs

(6.6)

Amicus
Briefs

Work-Related
Attributes
All Attributes

Probability Decision Issued in the Last
Two Weeks of the Term
Value of Big
Month of Oral Argument
Measure
Nov
Feb
April
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Notes:
(1) The regression coefficients in column (3) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables. All
regressions use robust standard errors. Significance levels are indicated by * at .05 level and ** at .01 level.
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations.
(3) The dependent variable in all regressions is whether the Court issued its decision in the last two weeks of
the term (1) or otherwise (0). All regressions include month and term dummy variables. Regressions 6.2 and
6.4 also include the work-related attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two
Issues, Three or More Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 6.3 and 6.6 include both work-related and otherattribute variables (Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration).
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In all models, the probability that a case will be decided in the
last two weeks of the term is significantly greater for big cases than
for other cases even after controlling for the month of oral argument,
47
the term, and work-related and other case attributes. We also
continue to observe significantly greater gross than net big-case
effects in Table 6 as shown by the regression coefficients in column
(3) and the predicted probabilities in columns (5)–(7).
b. Does the Chief Justice Matter? We consider here whether the
big-case effects observed in Tables 5 and 6 depend on the identity of
the Chief Justice. Maybe some Chief Justices follow a policy of saving
the best for last and others do not. To test for this possibility, we use
only the New York Times and Amicus big-case measures because they
cover all cases decided between the 1946 and 2012 terms and so allow
us to test for differences across the five Chief Justices during that
48
period.
Table 7 presents the percentage of decisions covered on the front
page of the New York Times during the last week of the term (column
(3)) and in all other weeks (column (2)) for each Chief Justice. We do
the same for cases with four or more amicus briefs (columns (5) and
49
(4)). Since the Amicus measure is continuous (ranging from 0 to
143), there is no obvious dividing line between a big and non-big case;
our choice of four is arbitrary, and results in big cases being 25
percent of our sample, compared to 14 percent if the New York Times
measure is used instead.

47. The coefficients on the Dissent, Concur, Per Curiam, Civil Liberties, and
Unconstitutional variables are significant and in the predicted directions in the Table 6
regressions. Three or More Issues is positive and significant in regressions 6.2 and 6.5 but only
marginally significant in regressions 6.3 and 6.6. The other work-related and other-attribute
variables are in the predicted directions but are not significant except for the negative
coefficient on the Nine Justices variable in regression 6.3.
48. Recall that the CSI covers the 1953–2004 terms and Citations the 1946–2001 terms, so
these measures would exclude the Roberts era.
49. Table 7 compares only the last week of the term to earlier weeks, but notice that the
results are substantially the same if we substitute the last two weeks for the last week.
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Column (1) shows that the percentage of cases decided in the last
week of the term has remained relatively constant (in the range of
15.6 to 17.3 percent) since the Vinson Court. Big cases are
disproportionately decided at the end of the term for all Chief
Justices in our dataset (compare columns (2) and (3) with columns (4)
50
and (5)).
Notice the sharp upward trend, starting with the Burger Court, in
the percentage of cases in which four or more amicus briefs are filed.
For cases decided in the last week (column (4)), the percentage rises
from an average of 32.8 during Burger’s tenure to 86 percent during
Roberts’ tenure. A similar result holds for cases decided before the
last week; cases with four or more amicus briefs increase from 20 to
60.8 percent. This is consistent with a large body of literature
indicating that amicus curiae participation has increased markedly
51
over time. Notice also that there is a slight downward trend in New
York Times coverage since the Warren Court (columns (2) and (3)),
which is more pronounced for cases decided before the last week of
the term (column (2)).

50. Except for the Vinson era, all differences between columns (2) and (3) and columns (4)
and (5) are statistically significant.
51. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 24, at 751; Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein,
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of ‘Hakman’s
Folklore’, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 315–16 (1981).
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Table 7. Coverage on Front Page of the New York Times and Number
of Amicus Briefs by Week of Decision and Chief Justice, 1946–2012
Chief Justice

Vinson Court
(1946-52
Terms)
Warren
Court
(1953-68
Terms)
Burger Court
(1969-85
Terms)
Rehnquist
Court
(1986-04
Terms)
Roberts
Court
(2005-12
Terms)

Percentage of
Decisions
Issued in the
Last Week of
the Term
(1)

15.6

Percentage of Cases
Receiving Front-Page
Coverage in the New York
Times
Case
Case
Decided
Decided
Before
Last Week
Last Week
(2)
(3)
9.5
14.3
(606)
(112)

Percentage of Cases with 4 or
More Amicus Briefs

Decisions
Issued
Before Last
Week

Decisions
Issued
During Last
Week

(4)
3.5
(606)

(5)
5.4
(112)

16.2

15.7
(1459)

26.6**
(282)

3.2
(1459)

6.7**
(282)

16.0

11.1
(1965)

21.4**
(373)

20.0
(1965)

32.4**
(373)

15.8

12.8
(1554)

29.2**
(291)

44.1
(1554)

61.9**
(866)

17.3

6.7
(477)

24.0**
(100)

60.8
(477)

86.0**
(100)

Notes:
(1) Numbers in parentheses in columns (1)–(4) denote the number of cases decided either in the last week of
the term or in all other weeks.
(2) The levels of significance are * at the .05 level and ** at the .01 level. Statistical comparisons are within
each Chief Justice’s era. For example, for the Vinson Court the percentage of cases receiving front-page
coverage in the New York Times is 14.3 for a case decided in the last week and 9.5 for cases decided in all
other weeks. The absence of a * or ** indicates that the difference between 14.3 and 9.5 is not statistically
significant.

To explore the significance of the differences across Chief
Justices, we re-estimate the regression models in Table 5, adding five
dummy variables (one for each Chief Justice) which we interacted
with our big-case variable. For the New York Times measure, the
regression coefficient on each interacted Chief Justice variable
estimates the increase in the probability of a last-week decision in
cases that receive front-page Times coverage during the tenure of that
Chief Justice. Because the interacted Amicus measure captures the
increase in the probability for an additional amicus brief (which
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makes a big case more likely) we expect the coefficient to be small
but still positive.
Table 8 presents the regression results. We show only
coefficients (t-values in parentheses) for the five Chief Justice
variables, although all regressions include the month of oral argument
dummy variables. Regressions 8.2 and 8.5 also include work-related
attributes, and regressions 8.3 and 8.6 include both work-related and
52
other case attributes.
Table 8. Logit Analysis of the Probability that Case Was Decided in
the Last Week of the Term by Chief Justice
Equation
Number &
Dependent
Variable

Big-Case
Measures

(1)
(8.1)

Last
Week

(8.2)

Last
Week

(8.3)

Last
Week

(8.4)

Last
Week

(2)
New
York
Times
New
York
Times
New
York
Times
Amicus
Briefs

(8.5)

Last
Week

Amicus
Briefs

(8.6)

Last
Week

Amicus
Briefs

Attributes
Added to
Regression

Regression Coefficients (t-ratios)
Vinson

Warren

Burger

Roberts

(6)

Rehnquist
(7)

(4)

(5)

0.061**
(2.82)

0.079**
(4.64)

0.100**
(11.30)

0.113**
(7.79)

0.176**
(6.45)

WorkRelated
Attributes
All
Attributes

0.031
(1.18)

0.040*
(2.53)

0.034**
(3.85)

0.040**
(3.31)

0.079**
(3.18)

0.029
(1.11)

0.032*
(2.21)

0.027**
(2.95)

0.035**
(2.90)

0.072**
(2.87)

No

0.008
(1.22)

0.017**
(3.57)

0.009**
(5.78)

0.007**
(5.91)

0.005**
(9.10)

WorkRelated
Attributes
All
Attributes

0.008
(1.08)

0.013**
(3.20)

0.005**
(3.49)

0.003**
(3.87)

0.003**
(8.59)

0.008
(1.11)

0.013**
(3.31)

0.004**
(3.39)

0.003**
(4.03)

0.003**
(8.48)

(3)
No

(8)

Notes:
(1) The regression coefficients in columns (4)–(8) denote marginal effects at the mean values of all variables.
All regressions are clustered on the term variable. Significance levels are * at .05 level and ** at .01 level.
(2) The New York Times and Amicus regressions cover the 1946 to 2012 terms and include 7219 observations.
(3) The dependent variable in all regressions is whether the Court issued its decision in the last week of the
term (1) or otherwise (0). All regressions include the month variables. Regressions 8.2 and 8.4 also include the
work-related attribute variables: Fraction Dissent, Fraction Concur, Per Curiam, Two Issues, Three or More
Issues, and Nine Justices. Regressions 8.3 and 8.6 include both work-related and other-attribute variables
(Civil Liberties, Economic Activity, Unconstitutional, and Precedent Alteration).

52. We do not include the term dummies in the regressions because of the significant
overlap with the Chief Justice variables. However, the regressions are clustered on the term
variable.
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Consider the coefficient of 0.176 for Roberts in regression 8.1. It
tells us that the predicted probability of decision in the last week of
the term is 0.176 greater for a Roberts Court case that appears in the
New York Times than for one that does not, holding constant the
month of the oral argument (the gross big-case effect for Chief Justice
Roberts). We find smaller but still significant probability increases for
the other Chief Justices. Except for Roberts, the differences across
Chief Justices in regression 8.1 are not significant. As expected, we
find smaller but still significant net big-case effects for all our Chief
Justices, except Vinson, when we include work-related attributes
(regression 8.2), and work-related plus other attributes (regression
8.3). We also find no significant difference in the coefficients across
Chief Justices in regressions 8.2 and 8.3—that is, we accept the null
hypothesis that net or pure big-case effects across the five Chief
Justices are not significantly different from each other. Turning to the
Amicus measure, we find significant big-case effects in the three
regressions for all the Chief Justices except Vinson. We also find no
significant differences across Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts for both
the gross and net big-case effects but a larger effect for Warren. We
have no explanation why the Warren Court Amicus effects are
significantly greater than the effects for the other Chief Justices.
Overall, the effects we observed in Table 5 do not depend on the
identity of the Chief Justice.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court decides its cases with dispatch—
with a tiny exception for the rare case held over for reargument in the
next term, all cases are decided in the same term in which they are
53
argued, hence in less than a year —there is this curious phenomenon,
quantified in this Article, of decisions in big cases tending to cluster at
the end of the Court’s term. It could just be that big cases (as
determined by our four measures of “bigness”) have attributes that
make it take longer for the Court to decide them, most clearly
perhaps the number of separate opinions in a case, which are bound
to lengthen the path from argument to decision. But while the work-

53. Many federal court of appeals decisions are decided a year or more after oral
argument. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS SUMMARY—
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 2014, at 2 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.us
courts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2014/appeal
s-fcms-summary-pages-june-2014.pdf.
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time attributes do lengthen the path, clustering near the end of the
term occurs even when they are not present; that is what we called the
big-case net effect.
And so the question is why. We can only speculate, but three
possibilities come to mind. The first centers on legacy and
reputational concerns: when writing what they think will prove to be
major decisions the Justices take more time, polishing and polishing
(or making their law clerks polish and polish, since nowadays law
clerks do most judicial writing even in the Supreme Court) until the
last possible moment, with the hope of promoting their own
reputation. After all, excerpts of some of these big cases will find their
way into the popular press and, more importantly, into casebooks that
generations of law students will read; and, most importantly, the cases
may continue to be remembered, discussed, and cited long, long after
54
they are decided.
A second possible explanation is that the Justices delay certain
decisions for public-relations reasons. The close proximity of
decisions in the most important cases may tend to diffuse media
coverage of and other commentary regarding any particular case, and
thus spare the Justices unwanted criticism. But the opposite effect is
possible: the expectation of a crowd of important cases at the end of
the term can increase media attention, as in Slate’s “Breakfast Table”
end-of-term roundup.
Finally, though related to the second explanation, the Justices,
most of whom have busy social schedules in Washington, may want to
avoid tensions at their social functions by clustering the most
controversial cases in the last week or two of the term—that is, just
55
before they leave Washington for their summer recess.

54. Another way to state this point is that the variables we include in the end-of-term
regressions (month and term dummies, work-related and other attributes) do not fully account
for the time the Justices spend on a case, so there remains a net big-case effect.
55. When asked by a questioner where Chief Justice Roberts was going after the end of the
term, Roberts said that he “was about to leave for Malta, where he would teach a two-week
class on the history of the Supreme Court. ‘Malta, as you know, is an impregnable island
fortress,’ he said on Friday, according to news reports. ‘It seemed like a good idea.’” Adam
Liptak, Roberts Makes a Getaway from the Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A10.

